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Executive Summary
In recent years, an increase in government accountability has come about in
American society. The debate began about the consumer business model of
government, with citizens demanding results, not just output, because most people
viewed government as inefficient and ineffective. As a response, Vice President Gore
National Performance Review endorsed the Government Performance and Results
Act (1993) which required federal agencies to have “objective, quantifiable and
measurable” goals into the federal government budget process (Kravchuk and
Schack, 1996, p.348).
This, in turn, led the way to the Government Performance Project (GPP), a study
orchestrated by the Governing magazine, in cooperation with several universities and
journalists. Researchers formulated a set of criteria to evaluate state governments on
performance and, more specifically, quality of management. States would have a
comprehensive peer comparison which the researchers felt would help managers
improve management, which in turn would lead to better results.
While the measurement of government performance appears to be a relatively recent
phenomenon, in fact, a literature review reveals it has some old roots. In the early
twentieth century, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research collected data in an
attempt to promote the measurement of government performance (Williams, 2003,
p.2). From there, subsets of variables which potentially affect government
performance have been examined by a host of researchers. These variables include
social capital, political affiliations, budget priorities, size of government, and
management.
Due to the growing interest in performance measurement use, I have examined how
the GPP may be influenced by per capita expenditures. I have expanded on a 2002
study performed by Steve Knack of the World Bank. More specifically, does a state
that spends more have a higher quality management, thus producing a higher grade?
I have used independent variables from other studies as controls.
For my analysis, I have used both GPP data and U.S. Census Bureau financial and
demographic information to estimate a model relating the GPP measures of state
government management quality to the characteristics of the state. Most importantly,
I examined the effect of state expenditures in a number of alternative government
functions on quality of management and found no correlation between expenditures
and these performance measures. However, control variables, such as political
affiliations of state population, and demographic information do relate to the grades.
Conclusions can be formed that expenditures and financial data were statistically
significantly weakly related to the Government Performance Project grade. A more
substantial implication of this study is that state can be in deficit in many
socioeconomic and financial areas and yet still function at a high level of
management performance.

Introduction
Politicians and pundits have tried to expose the inefficiencies of government.
Especially in the United States, political parties campaign on these deficiencies and
promise to run government more efficiently without cutting services to their
constituents. The public seems to want government efficiency but it appears citizens
perceive little evidence that governments are actually efficient. Lack of trust in
government is one of the main reasons citizens perceive inefficiencies. (Bouckaret
and Van de Walle, 2001).
Melkers &Wiloughby’s research suggested some ideas in bridging the gap:
•

Government must be driven by citizen desires and needs, not by government
rules and regulations.

•

Taxpayers will pay for results, not effects

•

Government must better communicate progress toward goals and objectives
(Melkers &Wiloughby, 1998, pg 2)

As Melkers and Wiloughby suggest, communication is important, but how do you
show results to taxpayers? One way is the adoption of performance-based measures.
By 1992, one-third of U.S. counties used performance-based measurement and onefifth reported high usage (Hatry and Wholey, 1992, p. 1). Also, both the executive
and legislative branches of state and federal governments are users of the
measurements. Melkers and Wiloughby explain that, “Executive and legislative
budget players are increasingly alike in their consumption of performance data and
program analysis for purposes of budgetary decision making” (Melkers &Wiloughby,
1998, pg 2). States use performance-based measures extensively. “Thirty one states
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have legislation that requires performance-based budgeting and thirty two percent
have some form of performance-based budget instituted because of administrative
requirements such as through budget instruments or guidelines and six of the thirty
one states use benchmarks” (Melkers &Wiloughby, 1998, pg 2). Performance-based
budgeting varies across states, but the most used involves the identification of
performance indicators (Hackbart and Jordan, 1999, p. 9).
The issues of performance-based measures as found by Hatry and Wholey (1992)
include:
•
•
•
•
•
•

Outcome vs. impact
Validity and reliability issues
Acceptable performance levels
Cost
Reporting fears
Lack of utility for program managers

The key concerns for each issue are as follows: Is the program really affecting
the outcome or are external factors? Are there enough valid indicators of program
quality to avoid production of misleading information? Zero defects may not be a
feasible performance based level but what is? Performance-based monitoring can be
costly; the information may not always be accessible. The information may then be
used against program managers by elected officials, interest groups, and the media.
Lastly, the information may not be useful to the program managers and too
aggregated for their specific responsibility.
The main goal of performance-based measurements in government is
accountability, but this can be broken down into various purposes suggested by Behn.
“As part of their overall measurement strategy, the leaders of public agencies can use
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performance management to (1) evaluate (2) control (3) budget (4) motivate (5)
promote (6) celebrate (7) learn and (8) improve” (Behn, 2003, p.1). Then citizens use
this information to judge their government by four criteria: instrumental, bureaucratic,
contingency, and symbols and values (Bouckaert and Van de Walle, 2001, p.23)
Local governments especially are pressured to perform because of the close
proximity to the individual citizens. The reasons most listed by local governments for
the use of performance measures are citizen demands, pressure from elected officials,
and to make better management decisions. Particularly, local governments more
often use benchmarking even though there is little citizen participation in the process.
Only three percent of municipalities have citizens involved in reporting but sixty to
eighty percent use performance-based budgeting. (Poister and Streib, 1999, p. 3)
One of the first places government became accountable to its citizens was at
the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, an incorporated organization. “The
bureau stamped out waste, connected to academics, exported information to other
communities, and promoted its ideas to government officials, government agencies,
and the federal government” (Williams, 2003, p.1).
There are ways other than performance-based measurements which hold
public officials accountable, such as elections, legal actions, and external audits. In
this paper, my primary focus is the effect of expenditures levels on the quality of
management in government. If the level of quality goes up due to expenditures then
the outcomes associated with that higher level of management will also be better. It
is a domino effect, if A causes B, and B causes C, then A and C also have a causal
relationship.
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Problem Statement
Much attention has been given to the performance-based measurements
movement. It would be interesting to examine if money makes a difference in the
quality of management of states and leads to an effective government. For decades,
there has been a focus on procedures which lead to outcomes. There has also been a
belief that leadership and good management are key components of whether a
program or policy is successful. In 2004, this was proved empirically by Ingraham
and Moynihan using a model in which the dependent variable was decision making
and the independent variables concerned leadership styles. Extreme examples of this
may be New York Mayor Rudolph Gianni’s leadership during 9-11 (when leadership
works well) and the delayed response to Hurricane Katrina by the Federal Emergency
Management Agency (when leadership works poorly). However, not much has been
done on how public outlays play a part in the overall performance of a state.
The Government Performance Project (GPP), a research study orchestrated by
Governing magazine, makes this assertion about the link of management and
performance, “To a large extent, policy outcomes depend on the quality of the
underlying management systems – child welfare systems fail if the state doesn't have
an appropriate employee recruitment and training system; getting a drivers license is a
nightmare if the information systems are not up to date; classroom sizes grow as
unexpected budget shortfalls cause teachers to be laid off. (GPP website, 2005)”
Education in the United States is one major area that has been studied
concerning expenditures and performance outcomes. In 1994, Hedges, Lane, and
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Greenwald found that total expenditures do affect outcomes if allocated to the right
areas (global resources and other input costs). They completed a meta analysis using
Hanushek’s 1989 data. Another study completed by Jaggia and Vachharajani in 2004
of Texas schools also suggests direct expenditures are linked to student performance
when those expenditures are for teacher instruction. Nikolova comments in her
capstone literature review, “The most exhaustive and famous research on this topic is
a study by Card and Krueger (1992). The authors estimate the rate of return to
additional schooling for men born between 1920 and 1949, concluding that cost and
quality of educational inputs on the one hand, and the gain in earnings attributable to
educational attainment on the other, are related in a meaningful manner.” Therefore,
given education spending is a part of overall government spending, an exploration
into effects of expenditures on management and consequently into performance is
warranted.
As noted above by the GPP citation, managers are key players in programs.
Expenditures are also key in program outcomes, therefore public outlays must in
some way lead to better managers. Coffe and Greys note in their study, “financial
management constitutes a crucial part of the government’s functioning and good
performance in this area is at the basis of future well-being.” (Coffe and Greys, 2005,
p.6) In this paper, I am asserting that good financial management is not only using
resources wisely but making sure you have enough resources to allocate.
Research Question
My research question is do state expenditures affect the quality of state
management? To set the stage for my research question, an article by Jacoby and
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Schneider examines the history of expenditures effect on government and finds,
“Expenditure commitments are often the targets of those who would influence
government, such as parties and interest groups, as well as individual citizens
(Raimondo 1996: Winters 1999). All astute observers of the political system know
that adequate financing is a necessary precondition for any meaningful policy activity
(Garand and Hendrick 1991). Therefore, public expenditures have a profound effect
on the ways that state governments ultimately address issues and ameliorate social
problems” (Jacoby and Schneider, 2001, p. 546).
My capstone assesses the effects of expenditures and other characteristics of
the state on the quality of management. What impact does money have on quality of
management and therefore performance? Overall, I think it is important to look at the
underlying assumption that if money is put into infrastructure, information, and
people, then quality of management will be better. Therefore, my hypothesis is: the
more resources the better the quality of management.
To complete my analysis I used the grades assigned by the Government
Performance Project (GPP) as an indicator of good management. I factored in sociodemographic, and financial information of the state to estimate what could be
correlated with the grade. These factors include what other studies have looked at:
political factors and social capital factors. As a side note, Kentucky did well in the
GPP assessment, scoring a B+ overall. The some of the reasons cited were last year’s
increase in the Commonwealth’s “rainy day fund” and the Kentucky Transportation
Cabinet’s new “one stop shop” which allows Kentuckians to purchase any type of
vehicle registration at one location.
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My program theory for this project is: more expenditure lead to more
resources at the disposal of management which, in turn, causes quality of
management to increase which will then lead to better performance and a more
effective government.
My logic model for this theory includes a whole host of assumptions which
must be made for the program theory to hold. I assume throughout my model that a
state has the ability to increase its expenditures. I also assume that if there is more
money, money will be spent on not only public program delivery but also the
administration costs. Both will lead to better state management and management
systems. As noted in this paper, good management can lead to better outcomes and
performance.
Later, I will expand on how expenditures priorities for state budget officials
reflect the preferences of those officials. It would also be logical to assume your
preferences can be connected to managerial styles. If you prefer one program over
another you will dedicate more of your time and resources in seeing that program
succeed. Managerial capacity is also directly linked to government performance;
therefore expenditures must be linked to the managerial capacity and performance.
The quality of management is key in the performance of a program. How
people choose to lead and how these leaders then make decisions have a direct impact
on organization. The leadership of an agency can make the performance of the agency
weak or strong. In this study, I wanted to piece together all these factors and find if
my assumptions held true. A casual relationship may exist been expenditures and the
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managerial capacity of state government and if so then there is a relationship between
performance.
Literature Review
All citizens, regardless of the form of government want maximized results
from their taxation. This has stemmed back before the twentieth century, before the
New York Bureau of Municipal Research (BMR), and probably before a government
was called a government. This preoccupation with return on investment is as old as
time. There has been study after study on performance-based governing. For my
purposes, I began in 1904 with the Schachter’s study on Dr. William H. Allen, Henry
Bruere, and Fredrick Cleveland at the BMR which focused on citizen education and
performance-based reporting of all financial matters by compiling transaction data
(Schachter, 1995 pg. 3).
Four lessons we can take from BMR:
1. Measurement for a practical use
2. Effective measurement is both efficient and effective
3. Be aware of political constraints but get support for long term
4. Focus not only on outcomes but inputs
(Williams, 2003, p.12)
Before one can jump empirically into the notion of performance-based
government we must look at two models of government: are we reinventing
government or reinventing the idea of a citizen. Another way to approach this is a
consumer-business model or an owner-business model. Are citizens consumers of
government, meaning they can just pick and choose their services and find alternate
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sources for roads, schools and defense if the government does not please them, or is
government more a collective ownership in which the citizens work through the
difficult times to ensure that the government functions properly? Hindy Schachter
makes the argument for an owner-citizen model in which the citizen must be educated
from an early age to actively watch the government’s actions (Schachter, 1995, pg.8).
The study of performance-based management is very extensive. Coggburn and
Schneider describe the history of the model I am drawing from, “Similar positive
results have been obtained by researchers using the concept of “managerial capacity”.
Donahue, Selden and Ingraham (2000) find a link between local governments’ human
management capacity and the performance of its human resources. Similarly,
O’Leary and Yandle (2000) find a relationship between state institutional capacity
and state environmental dispute resolution programs: States with greater institutional
capacity tend to have stronger environmental dispute resolution programs. Coggburn
and Schneider go on to comment, “Although the substantive areas addressed vary, as
do the specific administrative and managerial features examined, findings generally
point to the importance of public management to government performance”
(Coggburn and Schneider, 2003, pg 10)
Another factor that has been addressed in government performance is social
capital: the positive externalities derived from belonging to a group which includes
civic engagement and social connectedness. Robert Putnam first explored this
concept in Democracy at Work; the book was derived from his research studying
Italian municipalities. During this time, Putnam compared the North and South
regions, looking at the development of social capital in each region. The interesting
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part of the research is that the North appeared to have a higher level of civic
engagement because of the long history of having city-state government whereas the
South region had a period of authoritarian style government beginning in 900 AD.
(Fisher, 1995) Later in 1995, Putnam explored the decline of social capital in
America and created a social capital index derived from answers given on the Life
and Style and Roper Social and Political Trends survey. Putnam’s book, Bowling
Alone, his research examined social trust in government, the frequency of visiting
with friends, club meeting attendance, and membership in groups interested in a
better government. One interesting fact he found was Americans bowl more than
ever but not in leagues where interacting builds social capital.
Steve Knack (2002) created a model using Robert Putnam’s research in 1993
as factors associated with government performance. Knack specifically looked at
GPP grades as the dependent variable and then used both Robert Putnam’s
measurements and found more recent data from the United States Census Bureau to
get measurements for volunteering, and census response. Knack used social trust,
index of informal socializing, attendance at club meetings, membership in good
government groups, volunteering and census response as independent variables.
Overall, with constants added, income and education variables are significant when
looking at social capital. The financial management GPP grade had significance with
volunteering, census response, and good government members. The capital
management grade was significantly correlated with the volunteering census response
and good government members. The human resources grade correlates with census
response and social trust.
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Schneider and Coggburn used the grades as an independent variable along
with state-level public opinion, interest group (number of state employee per capita),
state budget priorities, and state government ideology. The dependent variable: state
budget priorities were derived from an earlier piece of research where Schnieder
collaborated with Jacoby. “Specifically, management capacity is directly related to
state policy priorities: It has a profound influence on the state official’s allocation
decisions. From an analytical standpoint, this suggests that management capacity
affects state policy in distinct ways-both in establishing state priorities and (as
suggested by other research) in shaping program outcomes” (Coggburn and
Schneider, 2003, p. 6). They then draw this conclusion, “In short, we assert that
governments with more management capacity have the ability to perform better than
governments with less management capacity, all else being equal.” (Coggburn and
Schneider, 2003, p.4) Schnieder and Jacoby used a spatial proximity model and
concentrated on how states divided up their available pools of money to reach their
state priorities model. Coggburn and Schnieder also comment in the study that “the
strong relationships observed between citizen and state government ideology
measures and state policy priorities generally supports earlier research depicting the
importance of political factors, to state policy outputs studied by Jacoby and
Schneider 2001, Leighley and Hill, and Wright, Erikson, and McIver 1987”
(Coggburn and Schneider, 2003, p.4).
Lastly, Moynihan and Ingraham explored the model of decision making
(dependent variable) and the effects political leadership, central agency leadership,
citizen demand, politics, and professionalism have on it to construct a model of
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performance-information use. They go on to confirm decision making does make a
difference. (Ingraham and Moynihan, 2004 p.1). Ingraham goes on to expand in
Integration of Management Systems that leadership is key in managing for results but
other factors need to be addressed.
Methodology
I looked at the GPP grade as a measurement of effective management for state
government. In effect, the grades are a set of benchmarks or criteria that I used to
explain the effectiveness of government management using per capita expenditures
for each state, along with political affiliation, social capital, gross state product, and
state demographic information. This information is measurable and obtainable for all
fifty states. This grade will be my dependent variable.
The GPP is an exploration into the quality of management of state
governments. This endeavor was started by the Maxwell School of Syracuse
University and Governing magazine. They examined several factors which include
management of people, information, infrastructure, and money. GPP has looked at
both states and cities. Started in 1999 and funded by the Pew Charitable Trusts, the
project most recently decided to focus more on certain outcomes of management
rather than just reporting. Originally, they concentrated more on capital management,
information technology, financial management, and managing for results. Now, they
have streamlined their criteria. Using information that is mostly self-reported in
surveys or on websites, the GPP team would formally assess what closely fits the
criteria.
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The items assessed by the GPP are too extensive to list here but I will
highlight the different indicators in each segment.
People
•
•
•
•
•
•

The state regularly conducts and updates a thorough analysis of its human
resource needs.
The state acquires the employee it needs.
The state retains a skilled workforce.
The state develops its workforce.
The state manages its workforce.
The state manages it workforce performance programs effectively.

Money
•
•
•
•
•

Long-term: The state uses a long term perspective to make decisions.
Budget Process: The state’s budget process is transparent and easy to follow.
Structural Balance: The state’s financial management activities support a
structural balance between ongoing revenues and expenditures.
Contracting and Purchasing: The state effectively manages procurement
activities.
Financial Controls and Reporting: The state systematically assesses the
effectiveness of its financial operations and management practices.

Information
•
•
•
•
•

The state actively focuses on future policy and collecting information to
support that policy direction.
Elected officials, the state budget office, and agency personnel have
appropriate data on the relationship between costs and performance, and they
use these data when making resource allocation decisions.
Agency managers have the appropriate information required to make program
management decisions.
The governor and agency managers have appropriate data that enables them to
assess the actual performance of policies and programs.
The public has appropriate access to information about the state, the
performance of the state programs and state services and is able to provide
input to state policymakers.
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Infrastructure
•
•
•
•
•

The state conducts a thorough analysis of its infrastructure needs and has a
transparent process for selecting infrastructure projects.
The state has effective process for monitoring infrastructure projects
throughout their design and construction.
The state maintains its infrastructure according to generally recognized
engineering practices.
The state comprehensively manages its infrastructure.
The state creates effective intergovernmental and interstate infrastructure
management networks.

The GPP offers transparency, comparability, and systematic assessment. It grades
all states using the same criteria and focuses on procedures. It sets a criterion that
expresses a clear goal. However, GPP is not without critics, Kirlin stated there is no
evidence of outcomes on any one of the measured effects (Kirlin, 2001, pg. 2).
Additionally, it is important to mention not all report cards are created equal as
determined by Coe and Brunet in 2006; one has to look at the issuer and focus on
their intents. Also, people in the field have commented GPP has little independent
verification.
Between 2001 and 2005, leadership of the project shifted from Syracuse
University to Governing magazine. In 2005, the grades carry a disclaimer from the
developers that grades are not comparable to previous years because the new criteria
are focused on the ability of state governments to produce results. I agree somewhat
because the criteria has become more defined but has the same underlining themes
throughout. Some topics where dropped or renamed in 2005, the new categories are
as follows money, infrastructure, information, and people. The main focus is still on
practice and process. They believe there is a connection between the quality of
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management and management systems and performance. They want to help states
get better results.
The majority of my independent variable data came from the US Census Bureau.
The following are special variables I used in my model: majority vote in states during
the Bush and Kerry presidential election, log of total expenditures per capita and per
capita gross state product for 2004 along with Steve Knack’s variables of percent
with of high school diploma (2000), percent African American (2000), the Gini
coefficient of income inequality for 1999 and the log of population for 2004. For my
purposes, I used median family income for 2000 instead of per capita income.
When looking at Hawaii and Alaska, the social capital variable was not
calculated and therefore these states were dropped from the study. District of
Columbia was not included in the model because no GPP grade was calculated.
First, I performed a correlation matrix of all the coefficients on one another to
obtain the relationships. I concentrated most on the overall grade dependent variable
because it is the most representative of the general quality of the state management as
a whole. I found no heteroscedasiticty in my model. To control for
heteroscedasiticity I ran STATA using the robust command. I also considered
endogeneity between the X variables and Y but because the grades are not that widely
known, used only in the public sector, the grades do not cause the X variables
especially when looking at education, income and other race variables. In other
words, people do not make residence choices based on the “grades” and therefore
well-performing states do not attract the best and brightest. Social capital may be the
only variable with real concerns of endogeneity as cited in the Coffe and Greys study,
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social capital can be an endogenous variable when talking about performance but
when I completed the correlation matrix, there is weak correlation.
Findings
The findings after running a correlation matrix, show that little colinearity
exist between my explanatory variables. Most of my R squares are very low. I first
checked the distribution of my overall grade on the subparts. The adjusted R squared
is 96 percent. Therefore, I can assume the composition of the overall grade is truly its
parts.

Table 1
Correlation Matrix
Overall
Overall
Money
People
Infrastruture
Information

Money
1.00
0.79
0.72
0.74
0.73

People
1.00
0.46
0.43
0.55

1.00
0.32
0.46

Infra

Inform

1.00
0.42

1.00

Table 2
Overall Grade

Mean
Standard Error
Median
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum
Count

2.668
0.06685
2.7
2.3
0.4727
1.7
3.7
50
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Table 3
Overall
Money
People
Infrastructure
Information
Constant

Coefficient
***0.2415
***0.281
***0.2875
***0.1764
0.051

R-squared
F-Stat
Significance levels
.10 = *
.05 = **
.01 = ***

0.9645
343.23

I completed both a Pearson coefficient in SPSS and an OLS regression in
STATA on many different models, combining some relevant independent variables
with each dependent variable. Table 7 in the appendix is a correlation matrix.
Because I started with five dependent variables, I could assess multiple models to see
what correlated, however nothing significantly correlated using my own models.
Knack’s model
In my major analysis, I completed a recreation of Steve Knack’s model using
the overall GPP grades for 2005. To complete the recreation on social capital I
included Putnam’s social capital index and used log family income in place of log per
capita income. I did find some similar results, however when I added per capita total
expenditures to the model it did not explain any more of the variation in the overall
grade. Thus, expenditures are not significant in any of the social capital models and
therefore had no effect on the GPP overall grade. The overall grade is the dependent
variable in each of these regressions.
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Table 4

0.003
0.068
0.843
0.286
0.056
0.033

HS_diploma

Log_pop

Afr. Amer

Standard Errors in italics
.10 = *
.05 = **
.01 = ***

-0.582
***0.135

-3.073
1.904

Log_median income

Gini Coefficient

0.192
0.28

-0.054
***0.147

0.079
**0.037

0.961
***0.275

0.003
0.066

-3.79
*1.733

0.136
**0.066

-0.466
***0.122

0.07
**0.031

0.882
***0.276

0.033
0.054

-0.279
1.841

0.14
***.040

-0.371
**0.169

0.073
**0.029

0.509
0.319

0.085
0.063

-2.142
2.107

.129
.054

-0.57
***0.14

0.053
0.032

0.822
***0.289

0.04
0.071

-2.795
1.859

0.018
0.048

-0.536
***0.145

0.066
**0.031

0.89
**0.372

0.012
0.079

-2.631
1.72

0.446
*0.232

Informal socializing Social trust Volunteering Census response Club meeting Good Govt Member
41.498
42.852
14.239
19.297
41.498
38.616
20.064
18.679
20.926
24.953
20.064
18.005

Social Capital

Constant

Knack's Model
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Table 5

0.2187

0.3073173
0.4375561

0.2405

Log Population

Log_per capita Expend

Standard Errors in italics
.10 = *
.05 = **
.01 = ***

R squared

0.1527245
0.1432168
*0.0840519 **0.0855681
0.0472438
0.44058

-5.5099237
5.429776

Gini Coefficient

-4.683786
5.627079

0.013802 0.0204525
*0.009444 **0.0108411

0.0512738
0.0362751

-0.7412312
0.6128332

0.6521687
1.186751

Afr. Amer

0.651245
**0.0332963

-0.5790148
0.6156214

Log_Family income

HS_diploma

-0.177786
0.1486626

Social Capital Variable

0.2142

0.1054484
0.4243805

0.1436555
*0.0868809

-5.557399
5.584562

0.0177679
0.0093513

0.0541786
**0.037873

-0.7165126
0.6145242

0.0268873
.0971967

0.2302

-0.0601173
0.3681691

0.1516683
0.0915713

-4.532708
5.928569

0.017849
0.0091528

0.0601154
0.0331516

-0.8276545
0.6070812

.5123754
1.932052

0.2449

0.1594734
0.410161

0.1411242
*0.0838819

-5.556824
5.414746

0.1059263
*0.0090278

0.0694088
**0.0337757

-0.7969239
0.6043263

-0.876114
0.0678579

0.3164

-0.1098327
0.4933066

0.2817201
***0.1031893

-5.254679
5.951341

0.0171775
*0.0099034

0.0406403
0.0371452

-0.7052468
0.6619374

0.5063627
*0.2740193

0.2132

0.1126226
0.4267459

0.1507392
*0.0870804

-5.289094
5.52896

0.0177976
**0.0098191

0.0560599
*0.0385308

-0.7137332
0.6180038

0.0271687
0.171365

Recreation of Knack's Model with Expenditures using 2005 Grades
Overall Grade is the dependent variable
Informal socializing Social trust Volunteering Census response Club meeting Good Govt Member Soc Capital Index
Constant
2.679832
3.14864
5.004708
6.395863
5.078109
4.750615
4.658361
5.905871
6.309392
6.032558
5.761971
5.695737
6.29157
5.84585
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Table 6

0.2607513 0.4540189
0.270935 *0.2769291

-4.05311
5.753496

0.2721

-0.0024064
0.0121004
0.6315222
0.5584578
-5.410992
5.699912

0.2596

Republican 2004 (Red)

Per capita _GSP

Per cap total expend

Gini Coefficient

Standard Errors in italics
.10 = *
.05 = **

R squared

0.014908 0.0242995
0.0099527 **0.0111728

Afr. Amer

0.6017701
0.5523754

-0.0021459
0.0120015

0.1535048 0.1794181
*0.0922147 *0.0926282

Log_pop

0.041836
0.0371039

0.1385844
0.9219642

0.0641805
**0.0342891

-0.0537731
0.9203075

Log_Family income

1.4629
1.279874

HS_diploma

-0.1288244
0.1588937

Social Capital

0.2481

-5.500431
5.784374

0.5772451
0.566864

-0.0031409
0.0122464

0.3298695
0.2590058

0.0180247
*0.0097963

0.1544432
*5.784374

0.0548273
0.0382591

0.0031163
0.9296818

0.0285896
.0981092

0.2339

-4.163973
6.318426

-0.0053907
0.3971142

-0.0016731
0.0122704

0.0820646
0.1941045

0.0178949
*0.0098689

0.1503015
0.0998222

0.060212
*0.0345584

-0.6060141
0.8781548

.6026373
1.998567

0.2875

-5.769652
5.599022

0.7067856
0.5513604

-0.0014358
0.011897

0.3771806
*0.2541813

0.0155422
*0.0093776

0.1584289
*0.090113

0.0709192
**0.0340792

-0.0731898
0.9025796

-0.0999839
0.0684491

0.372

-2.514709
6.40857

0.3037726
0.6353189

-0.0180808
0.0154381

0.3068013
0.2858957

0.0189364
*0.010063

0.2641439
***0.1067944

0.0573175
0.0388632

0.4431852
0.9717592

0.4100317
0.2828041

0.2469

-5.286043
5.747021

0.5873637
0.5676325

-0.002581
0.0122608

0.3307586
0.259243

0.0179053
*0.010109

0.1633393
*0.0948756

0.0567259
0.0395129

-0.0158828
0.9274567

0.0273485
0.1730879

Recreation of Knack's Model Using 2005 Grades
Overall Grade is the dependent variable
Informal socializing Social trust Volunteering Census response Club meeting Good Govt Member Soc Capital Index
Constant
-6.40364
-14.35961
-7.149628
3.32739
-7.795195
-12.86386
-7.298499
11.7688
13.059
11.83959
10.10809
11.47176
12.8241
11.85298

In both my models high school diploma, log of population, and African
American coefficients had a significant impact in most if not all my regressions
between the 5 and 10 percent levels. Good government member proved to be
significant at the 10 percent level in the first model but not in the second model when
I added gross state product and the dummy variable for Kerry/Bush election results.
High school diploma, population, and African American all had statistical significant
results in the positive direction on my overall grade.
The positive effect of high school diploma could indicate populations that are
educated create a higher quality pool of applicants to pull managers from. Also, the
greater the size of the population the greater the demands on the government and
therefore quality of management goes up. African American could be a signal of
diversity and therefore the higher the diversity of a state the greater the quality of
management. The independent variable red (majority of the state voted Bush) proved
have a significant effect on the overall grade when social trust and club meeting was
the social capital variable in the model. I don’t want to assume too much here but
maybe the more conservative states are more active in monitoring the state’s quality
of management.
Steve Knack’s model found that population, African American, and the Gini
coefficient all had statistical significance in his model. Social trust and volunteering
was also statistical significant. I was most surprised about not finding any
significance with my Gini coefficient, after Knack found it to be significant at the .01
level on most of his social capital variables models.
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One of the reasons why my results may not be conducive to Knack’s is he
used 1999 grades for dependent variables. He also separated out social capital into
five areas, three from Putnam’s index and he created two variables census response
and volunteering from outside sources. I added the combined social capital index
variable to my model and derived all but census response from Putnam’s data. Also,
I logged family income whereas Knack logged per capita income. Additionally, there
is a gap in time from Putnam’s data and my data, therefore the explanatory power of
my model is weakened.
The GPP contained a disclaimer that 2005 grades are not comparable to
previous years. As I have found here, this may be true because my results not match
Knack’s perfectly. Also, the generalization of Knack’s model comes into question.
Recommendation
I would like to recommend states need to focus also on their financial outlays
and socio-economic characteristics in order to increase the quality of management but
my analysis shows otherwise. It would be logical to assume that a state’s
demographics have a direct relationship to the quality of its management and thus its
performance and things one might consider: is the population educated, are they
aging, and what resources do they have available to them? I have found in my model
only certain things matter: population, education, and race. However, given my
results, I would like to recommend states not focus on expenditures to improve the
quality of management but on the size of the, education level of the state and diversity
of the state.
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Conclusions
•
•
•
•
•

States, whether poor or rich, can be well managed.
Expenditures, state productivity, and income inequality were weakly
correlated with quality of management.
Political affiliations of states may be a factor in overall quality
The overall grade is normal distribution among the subparts.
Expenditures functions are a normal distribution of total expenditures.

As suggested by Moynihan in 2006, the New Public Management policy ideas
adopted in New Zealand, Australia, and United Kingdom may not be as successful in
the United States because of the checks and balances we have which limit managerial
authority. Managerial authority is one of the key criteria in New Management Policy.
It is clear that certain social, political, and institutional conditions create
incentives for governments to do well as Kaufmann and Pritchett suggests in 1998 but
there is still no clear answer as to what mix of conditions specifically helps. There is
more than one reason to perform performance-based measurement though.
“Performance measurement may be done annually to improve public accountability
and policy accountability and policy decision making” write Wholey and Newcomer,
“or done more frequently to improve management and program effectiveness (Behn,
2003, p. 2).
One reason my model may have failed to produce any strong explanatory power
could be the model focused on expenditures with controls but other factors may
contribute that are not measurable and captured in the error term.
Limitations and future endeavors
If I had more time and resources I would have looked more at qualitative
variables such as leadership styles. Due to time and lack of quantifiable data I could
not gather information on all states concerning leadership and administrative data.
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Examples of administration data I could have gathered: employee evaluations,
retention rates for employees and rainy day fund amounts. This way I could confirm
the calculation of the grade.
In short, I would like to expand this to obtain a more representative model of
government performance and not use only political factors and demographic factors,
but try to capture per capita expenditures over a longer time period. Jaggia and
Vachharajani 2004 suggest time-series analysis can show more causality in
expenditures and outcomes (they were specifically looking at education) but time was
not a factor considered in my model.

27

References
Literature
.
Behn, R. D. (2003) Why measure performance? Different purposes require different
measures. Public Administration Review, 63(5) 586 Retrieved from ProQuest
Berman, E., Wang. X (2000). Performance measurement in U.S. counties: Capacity
for reform. Public Administration Review, 60(5) 409-421 Retrieved from ProQuest
Bouckaret, G. Van de Walle, S. (2001) Government performance and trust in
government. Permanent Study Group on Productivity and Quality in the Public
Sector at the EGPA Annual Conference Retrieved from EBSCOHost
Brunet, J.R., Coe, C.K. (2006) Organizational report cards: Significant impact or
much ado about nothing? Public Administration, 66(1) 90-100 Retrieved from
ProQuest
Coffe, H., Geys, B. (2005). Institutional performance and social capital: An
application to the local government level. Journal of Urban Affairs, 27 (5), 485
Retrieved from EBSCOHost
Coggburn, J. D., Schneider, S. K. (2003). The quality of management and
government performance: An empirical analysis of the American states. Public
Administration Review, 63(2) 206-214 Retrieved from ProQuest
Coplin, W. D., Merget, A. E. (2002) The professional researcher as a change agent in
the government-performance movement. Public Administration Review, 62(6) 699712 Retrieved from ProQuest
Fisher, M. (1995) Putnam: Making Democracy Work Review. Short Paper Archive
Retrieved April 25, 2006
http://www.la.utexas.edu/chenry/civil/archives95/csspapers.html
Hackbart, M. M., Jordan, M. M. (1999) Performance budgeting and performance
funding in the states: A status assessment. Public Budgeting and Finance, 19(1) 68-89
Retrieved from EconLit, EBSCOHost
Hatry, H. P., Wholey, J. S. (1992). The case for performance monitoring. Public
Administration Review, 52(6), 604-701 Retrieved from ProQuest
Hedges, L. V., Laine R. D. and Greenwald R. 1994. "Does Money Matter? A MetaAnalysis of Studies of the Effects of Differential School Inputs on Student
Outcomes." Educational Researcher 23:5-14.

28

Heinrich, C. J. (2002) Outcomes-based performance management in the public
sector: Implications for government accountability and effectiveness. Public
Administration Review, 62(6) 712-726 Retrieved from ProQuest
Ingraham, P. W., Moynihan, D. P. (2004) Integrative leadership in the public sector:
A model of performance-information use. Administration and Society, 36(4) 427-453
Retrieved from EBSCOHost
Ingraham, P.W., Jacobson, W., Selden, S. C. (2001). Human resource practices in
state government: Findings from a national survey. Public Administration Review,
61(5) 598-608 Retrieved from ProQuest
Jacoby, W. G., Schneider, S. K. (2001) Variability in state policy priorities: An
empirical analysis. Journal of Politics, 63(2) 544-568 Retrieved from EBSCOHost
Jaggia S. and Vachharajani V. 2004. "Assessing Performance: Spending and Learning
in Texas Public Schools." Research Report. <www.texaspolicy.com> (April 9, 2006).
Kaufmann, D. Pritchett, L. (1998). Civil liberties, democracy, and the performance of
Government projects. Finance & Development- World Bank 26-29 Retrieved from
EBSCOHost
Kirlin, J. J. (2001) Big questions for a significant public administration. Public
Administration Review, 61(2) 140-144 Retrieved from ProQuest
Knack, S. (2002). Social capital and the quality of government: Evidence from the
states. American Journal of Political Science 46(4) 772-785 Retrieved from JSTOR
Kravchuk, R.S., Schack, R.W. (1996) Designing effective performance-measurement
system under the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993. Public
Administration Review (56)4 348-358
Melkers, J. E., Wiloughby, K. G. (2001) Budgeters’ views of state performancebudgeting systems: Distinctions across branches. Public Administration Review,
61(1) 54-65 Retrieved from ProQuest
Melkers, J., Wiloughby, K. (1998). The state of the states: Performance-based
budgeting requirements in 47 out of 50. Public Administration Review, 58(1) 66-74
Retrieved from ProQuest
Moynihan, D. P. (2006) Managing for results in state government: Evaluating a
decade of reform. Public Administration Review, 66(1) 77-90 Retrieved from
ProQuest
Nikolova, N. (2005) Capstone: Does money matter: Assessment of educational
inputs and outputs in Kentucky Public Schools. Working Paper

29

Positer, T. H. Streib, G. (1999) Performance measurement in municipal government:
Assessing the state of practice. Public Administration Review, 59(4) 325-336
Retrieved from ProQuest
Rubenstein, R. Schwartz, A. Stiefel, L. (2003). Better than raw: A guide to measuring
performance with adjusted performance measures. Public Administration Review,
63(5) 607 Retrieved from ProQuest
Schachter, H. L. (1995). Reinventing government or reinventing ourselves: Two
models for improving government performance. Public Administration Review, 55(6)
530-538 Retrieved from ProQuest
Williams, D. W. (2003) Measuring government in the early twentieth century. Public
Administration Review, 63(6) 643 Retrieved from ProQuest
Data
State Government Expenditures. (2004). U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved 13 March
2006 from http://www.census.gov/govs/www/index.html
Government Performance Project. (Governing.com). Retrieved 1 March 2006 from
http://results.gpponline.org
Social Capital: Bowling Alone, Putnam, R. D Retrieved 17 March 2006 from
http://www.bowlingalone.com/putnam.php3
FedFacts. (2000) U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved 13 March 2006 from
http://www.fedfacts.gov
National Conference of State Legislatures Association Retrieved 13 March 2006 from
http://www.ncsl.org/
Gross State Product Northeast Midwest Institute Retrieved 17 March 2006 from
http://www.nemw.org/gsp.htm
Family income. (2004). U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved 13 March 2006 from
http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/income/statemedfaminc.html
Governors of all 50 states. Netstate.com Retrieved 13 March 2006 from
http://www.netstate.com/states/tables/st_governors.htm

30

Blue/red state. Guardian Unlimited Retrieved 13 March 2006 from
http://www.guardian.co.uk/flash/0,,1341057.html
Education Expenditures (2003). U.S. Census Bureau. Retrieved 13 March 2006 from
http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/pubs/npefs03/findings.asp#3
Median age US Census Bureau Retrieved 13 March 2006 from
http://factfinder.census.gov/servlet/

31

32

Overall
Soc_cap index
Census response
Volunteering
Social Trust
Club meeting
Good govt member
Informal socializing
log family income
HS degree
Log-pop
Afr American
Red
Per capita GSP
Log of total exp
Gini

Appendix
Table 7

Overall Soc_cap inCensus resVolunteeri Social TClub meet Good goInformal log family HS degree Log-pop Afr Amer Red Per capit Log of Gini
1.00
0.11
1.00
0.21
0.68
1.00
0.24
0.70
0.53
1.00
11.00
0.87
0.61
0.67 1.00
-0.09
0.70
0.52
0.35 0.58
1.00
0.24
0.72
0.45
0.40 0.47
0.62
1.00
-0.10
0.73
0.55
0.54 0.77
0.64
0.28
1.00
0.06
0.38
0.51
0.53 0.45
0.26
0.16
0.49
1.00
0.23
0.85
0.68
0.78 0.81
0.54
0.56
0.58
0.58
1.00
0.18
-0.45
-0.06
-0.10 -0.29
-0.31
-0.48
-0.24
0.09
-0.31
1.00
0.02
-0.76
-0.52
-0.58 -0.76
-0.47
-0.45
-0.58
-0.24
-0.61
0.25
1.00
0.11
-0.28
-0.33
-0.43 -0.45
-0.13
0.02
-0.59
-0.72
-0.35
-0.14
0.20 1.00
-0.07
0.27
0.33
0.44 0.22
0.32
0.12
0.39
0.75
0.45
0.01
-0.07 -0.53
1.00
-0.12
0.22
0.17
0.18 0.24
0.21
0.12
0.23
0.27
0.10
-0.10
-0.17 -0.59
0.18 1.00
-0.18
-0.73
-0.66
-0.54 -0.70
-0.50
-0.52
-0.04
-0.26
-0.76
0.51
0.53 0.11
-0.08 -0.03 1.00

